Safe science is good science by Schwartz, Antony et al.
SAFE SCIENCE
IS GOOD SCIENCE
ANTONY SCHWARTZ*, ADAM CLARKSON,  
RICHARD G. BAUMANN, SHRUTI M. GENTILLI,  
JEFFREY POTTS, AND RAFAEL TORRES-CRUZ.
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY, 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH SERVICES,  
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,  
BETHESDA, MARYLAND, USA
Copyright 2015, Fine Focus all rights reserved
MANUSCRIPT RECEIVED 11 MAY, 2015; ACCEPTED 29 MAY, 2015
*CORRESPONDING AUTHOR
FinalJournal.indd   153 9/25/15   11:38 AM
INTRODUCTION
Each year thousands of student researchers 
pursue honors theses and practicums at 
university laboratories in preparation for 
future careers. While many will learn 
the nuances of performing biomedical 
research, a majority will likely graduate 
without knowing much about biosafety. 
As a new generation of scientists emerge 
from academia, it is crucial that they learn 
about the value of biosafety and begin 
to develop safe work practices to protect 
themselves, others, and the environment. 
Researchers must practice laboratory 
techniques and safety skills with equal 
diligence. Individual responsibility is the 
foundation for developing a culture of 
safety in biomedical research.
WHAT IS BIOSAFETY?
Biosafety is a form of risk management. The 
ultimate goal of biosafety is to decrease the 
incidence of laboratory-associated infections 
(LAIs) by lowering the risk of accidental 
exposure to biological agents through 
a combination of risk assessment and 
mitigation strategies. There is never a total 
reduction in risk, but the probability of an 
undesired outcome can be reduced to almost 
zero with an appropriate understanding 
of the risks presented by the agent, the 
procedures involved in the research, and the 
facilities where the work is conducted.
The practice of biosafety has progressively 
become a mainstream discipline and an 
international profession in itself.  Several 
national and international biosafety 
associations exist to enable biosafety 
professionals to share best practices, inform 
policy discussions, and provide guidance 
on standards. Biosafety professionals work 
in occupational health and safety programs 
at universities, corporations, nonprofits and 
government agencies. They perform risk 
assessments and establish controls on practice 
and procedures to protect the worker, public, 
and environment. Hazard analysis, applied 
research, engineering, program management, 
emergency response, microbiology, molecular 
biology, and even investigative work are 
common elements of the biosafety profession.
WHAT SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED IN A RISK 
ASSESSMENT?
A risk assessment is a formal consideration 
of the potential hazards associated with 
a particular agent and its use. When 
conducting a biosafety risk assessment, one 
must be able to identify possible sources and 
routes of infection to the worker. Once the 
hazards are anticipated, specific controls can 
be put into place to reduce the risk of LAIs.
There are many factors that must be 
considered when conducting a standard 
risk assessment, but they can generally 
be categorized as either agent hazards or 
laboratory hazards. Agent hazards are the 
intrinsic or modified characteristics of a 
biologic that may have an adverse impact 
on health. The type of species or strain 
used, virulence, transmissibility, resistance, 
infectious dose, tropism, and other factors are 
crucial elements to consider when evaluating 
the inherent risk of an agent to cause 
disease. The potential outcomes of natural 
mutation and genetic engineering must also 
be considered when assessing the hazards 
of an agent. A determination as to whether 
a biological agent is harmful depends on 
the host as well. What may be a harmless 
microorganism to a healthy individual 
could be a formidable pathogen leading to 
disease in another individual who has a 
weakened immune system. For example, the 
yeast, Candida albicans, is an opportunistic 
pathogen commonly found in human flora. 
Individuals who are immunocompromised, 
such as those with autoimmune diseases or 
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who undergo chemotherapy treatment may 
develop serious disease when infected with 
this organism.
The risk of an LAI also depends 
on laboratory hazards.  Laboratory 
hazards are vulnerabilities in the lab 
environment that increase the risk of 
injury or illness. Unsafe practices such 
as recapping a syringe may lead to a 
sharps injury. Common practices like 
pipetting, vortexing, sonication, and other 
aerosol-generating procedures may create 
bioaerosols leading to a potential inhalation 
exposure. Faulty equipment such as a 
cracked seal in a centrifuge cup have been 
known to release aerosols. Among the most 
common of all laboratory hazards is the 
failure to wear the right attire and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) appropriate for 
the laboratory procedure to be performed.
Although risk assessment often involves 
considering many factors at the same 
time, its purpose is not to confound but 
to clarify. Its careful application reveals 
potential hazards and vulnerabilities before 
research begins. Preventive action can be 
taken to protect the worker and others. 
No matter how virulent or transmissible 
the microorganism, it cannot cause 
disease if proper biosafety measures are 
implemented to prevent exposure.
HOW IS RISK REDUCED?
Once the agent and laboratory hazards are 
assessed, steps must be taken to reduce the 
likelihood of potential harm to the worker. 
In the biosafety field, it is standard practice 
to categorize research with biological 
hazards according to a “biosafety level”. 
Based on the risk assessment, work with 
a pathogen can be assigned to Biosafety 
Levels (BSL) 1 through 4, with BSL-4 
offering the highest protection to the 
worker and the environment. Each biosafety 
level builds upon the safety requirements 
of the previous level. An appropriate 
combination of microbiological practices, 
safety equipment, personal protective 
equipment, and facility design according 
to each biosafety level reduces the risk of 
potential biological exposures.
An undergraduate microbiology teaching 
laboratory may be considered a BSL-1 
laboratory. BSL-1 typically involves work 
with agents that are not known to cause 
disease in healthy adults.  Bacillus subtilis, 
Naegleria gruberi, Escherichia coli (K12) 
are examples of agents that may be used 
in a BSL-1 laboratory. The protection 
afforded by BSL-2 practices and procedures 
should be utilized when working with 
moderate-risk agents that can be acquired 
through mucous membrane exposure, 
percutaneous injury or ingestion. Examples 
of agents that may be used in a BSL-2 
laboratory include Staphylococcus aureus, 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and the measles 
virus. In the case of measles, BSL-2 is 
appropriate because adequate vaccines 
are available.  Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) is 
assigned for potentially lethal agents that 
are known to be transmitted via aerosols 
and may or may not be indigenous to the 
region. Mycobacterium tuberculosis, highly 
pathogenic avian influenza A virus, and 
Francisella tularensis are a few common 
examples of agents worked with in BSL-3 
laboratories. When there are no treatments 
available for life-threatening infectious 
diseases caused by exotic pathogens, and 
there is a high individual risk to the worker, 
particularly through the aerosol route, 
these agents are handled under BSL-4 
conditions. These laboratories are usually 
referred to as maximum-containment 
facilities and provide the highest levels of 
protection for the laboratory worker. Ebola 
virus, Marburg virus, Crimean-Congo 
Hemorrhagic Fever virus and Nipah virus 
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are examples of pathogens that require 
BSL-4 containment.
In addition to these standard biosafety 
levels, there are specific containment 
designations depending on the activity being 
performed. For example, infectious disease 
work involving animals are designated as 
Animal Biosafety Levels 1, 2, 3 and 4 (ABSL). 
The challenges presented by the animal 
model are taken into consideration when 
performing a risk assessment. Animals can 
be unpredictable. They can bite, scratch, kick, 
shed fluids, produce splashes and aerosols, and 
increase the risk of accidental exposure to the 
worker. Some animals may even be infected 
naturally with zoonotic agents that can cause 
dangerous, sometimes deadly infections. 
Research involving large or loose-housed 
animals is conducted in specially designed 
BSL-3-Agriculture (BSL-3 Ag) laboratories. 
In this scenario, the risk assessment places 
greater emphasis on preventing the pathogen 
from escaping into the environment. If 
there were a release of an agricultural 
pathogen, the economic implications could 
be significant. For example, an accidental 
release of a pathogen that infects cattle could 
potentially impact a $44 billion industry. 
A useful resource for learning more about 
biosafety levels is the CDC/NIH publication, 
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical 
Laboratories 5th edition (4).
THE VALUE OF BIOSAFETY
Careful adherence to biosafety principles 
protects individuals, reputations, and 
research. Perhaps the best way to 
communicate the value of biosafety 
is through the tragic example of a 
laboratory-associated infection that 
occurred at Yerkes Regional Primate Center 
at Emory University. On October 29, 
1997, a young researcher was conducting 
a routine procedure that involved moving 
a non-human primate in caging. The 
primate, a rhesus macaque (Macaca 
mulatta), was unknowingly infected with 
a zoologic virus known as Macacine 
herpesvirus (formerly Cercopithecine 
herpesvirus 1 [CHV-1]). The pathogen can 
be present in monkey saliva, urine, fecal 
matter, and conjunctival fluid. Although 
disease is usually mild in primates, it is 
frequently deadly in humans who are 
exposed to the virus. During the transfer, 
the researcher suffered an ocular exposure 
to hazardous macaque fluids. Despite 
having flushed her eyes and later seeking 
medical attention, it was not enough to 
save the worker’s life. Just 42 days later, she 
died due to refractory respiratory failure 
from this seemingly minor exposure. 
A subsequent CDC/OSHA investigation 
found that the primate center believed the 
risk of CHV-1 exposure was thought to be 
low for the activity, that eye wash first aid 
was not conducted for at least 15 minutes, 
and that medical reporting and subsequent 
treatment was delayed. These factors 
contributed to a terrible outcome (1, 5).
Seemingly innocuous microorganisms 
can lead to serious LAIs as well. In 
2009, an associate professor at the 
University of Chicago became the 
first person to die from an accidental 
exposure to an attenuated Yersinia 
pestis strain. The researcher worked 
with pigmentation-negative KIM D27, 
a strain considered avirulent because of 
its iron-acquiring limitations. However, 
host factors in the researcher appear to 
have made the laboratory strain virulent. 
Hemochromatosis is a hereditary medical 
condition in which the body absorbs too 
much iron and deposits excess amounts 
in organs. It is believed that after the 
researcher experienced a percutaneous or 
mucosal exposure in the laboratory, the 
KIM D27 strain was able to establish an 
infection due to elevated iron levels in 
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his body. An investigation revealed that 
the researcher did not wear appropriate 
personal protective equipment and did not 
have current biosafety training. This case 
highlights the importance of consistently 
practicing biosafety recommendations to 
mitigate unknown risk factors (2).
It is clear that improper adherence to 
biosafety practices and resulting LAIs 
could have a devastating impact on the 
individual. However, it is worth taking a 
moment to appreciate the bigger picture: the 
impact unsafe practices in the laboratory 
could have on co-workers, the general 
public, the environment, and the overall 
research enterprise. Recently, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
has been in the news media about several 
incidents where biosafety protocols and 
procedures have been breached. Most 
notably, the unintentional exposure of 
personnel to potentially viable anthrax and 
the cross-contamination of non-pathogenic 
avian influenza virus with the highly 
pathogenic avian influenza virus strain 
H5N1. In both cases, the lack of proper 
adherence to biosafety protocols led to 
potential exposures outside the laboratory. 
As a result, research activities of the 
laboratories involved in this incident were 
suspended. Significant time and funding 
were spent to investigate the incidents, re-
inspect inventories, and retrain personnel. 
One could argue that the most important 
loss in the ensuing months has been the 
public trust and confidence in the scientific 
enterprise to conduct biomedical research 
safely with high-risk pathogens (3, 6). How 
can this trust be regained? How can future 
incidents be prevented? Diligent adherence 
to biosafety practices and procedures while 
working in the laboratory will ensure 
that workers are safe, the community and 
environment is protected and the progress 
of vital scientific research is not interrupted.
HOW CAN STUDENTS 
CONTRIBUTE TO BIOSAFETY?
Students can protect themselves and others 
by taking laboratory safety seriously. They 
should expect their departments to provide 
safe work spaces and comprehensive 
laboratory training. Before beginning 
research, students should make sure 
their project has undergone a formal risk 
assessment and that they feel comfortable 
performing it safely. Students should learn 
how to safely operate any equipment 
before using it and always follow standard  
operating procedures. Personal protective 
equipment must always be worn. Know 
what to do and whom to contact when an 
accident occurs, such as a spill, injury, or 
illness. If students have safety questions 
or concerns, they should make them 
known to their faculty or institutional 
safety office. Student researchers may 
even consider contributing to applied 
biosafety research, for example, by 
studying potential routes of contamination 
in a laboratory using a harmless surrogate 
or by evaluating the effectiveness of the 
institutional biosafety program.
SUMMARY
Biosafety is a multi-faceted discipline, 
a form of risk management designed to 
minimize the risk of biological exposures 
and prevent laboratory-associated 
infections. Biosafety professionals protect 
the research community’s health and safety 
by assessing research and setting risk 
reduction strategies. For these strategies 
to be successful, student researchers 
and faculty advisors must commit to 
incorporating them into their daily 
research activities. Those who understand 
the value of biosafety will not only 
protect themselves and others but will also 
advance research by realizing that safe 
science is good science.
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